Chapman Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 1

Article 2

2014

The Emerging Consensus for Cutting the
Corporate Income Tax Rate
Jordan M. Barry

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
Recommended Citation
Jordan M. Barry, The Emerging Consensus for Cutting the Corporate Income Tax Rate, 18 Chap. L. Rev. 19 (2014).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol18/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.

Do Not Delete

9/27/2014 9:56 PM

The Emerging Consensus for Cutting the
Corporate Income Tax Rate
By Jordan M. Barry*
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary tax policy circles are characterized by healthy
debates on a range of policy measures. However, a consensus has
emerged among tax policy experts on one point: the United
States should lower its statutory corporate income tax (“CIT”)
rate.1 Doing so would produce a number of benefits, both
internationally and domestically. This short Article summarizes
some of the chief benefits that are driving the consensus for a
reduced CIT rate. It also describes the surprising degree of
political agreement that has quietly emerged on this point.
I. INTERNATIONAL TAX BENEFITS
Much of the consensus surrounding the value of cutting the
U.S. CIT rate derives from concerns about U.S. competitiveness.

* Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
1 See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, Is the Corporate Tax System “Broken”?, 28 VA. TAX REV.
341, 363–66 (2008); Karen C. Burke, Passthrough Entities: The Missing Element in
Business Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (2013); Peter R. Merrill, Competitive
Tax Rates for U.S. Companies: How Low to Go?, 122 TAX NOTES 1009 (2009), available at
taxprof.typepad.com/files/tn1009.pdf; David M. Schizer, Fiscal Policy in an Era of
Austerity, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 453 (2012); Joseph J. Thorndike, The Durability of a
Dysfunctional Tax: Public Opinion and the Failure of Corporate Tax Reform, 21 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 347, 350 (2012); John Diamond & George Zodrow, The Case for Corporate
Income Tax Reform, A M. ACTION F. (May 29, 2013), http://www.americanactionforum.org/
research/the-case-for-corporate-income-tax-reform; Dan Maffei & Ryan McConaghy, The
Case for Corporate Tax Reform, THIRD WAY 1 (Aug. 2011), http://content.third
way.org/publications/434/Third_Way_Policy_Memo_-_The_Case_for_Corporate_Tax_Refor
m.pdf; Tax: Fundamentals in Advance of Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin. ,
110th Cong. 20–21 (2008) (statement of Michael J. Graetz, Professor of Law, Yale Law
School), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=dd061d06-e1ba5190-a38 f-6fbf4c8dab2e; PETE DOMENICI & ALICE R IVLIN, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR.,
RESTORING AMERICA ’S FUTURE: REVIVING THE ECONOMY, CUTTING SPENDING AND DEBT,
AND CREATING A SIMPLE, PRO-GROWTH TAX SYSTEM 17 (2010), available at http://www.bi
partisanpolicy.org/projects/domenici-rivlin-debt-reduction-task-force; see also Dylan
Matthews, Everyone Wants to Lower Corporate Tax Rates. Here’s How You Do It., WASH .
POST (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/09/26/
everyone-wants-to-lower-corporate-tax-rates-heres-how-you-do-it/ (“Everyone wants to cut
the corporate income tax rate. That’s one of the few areas of real common ground in
American tax policy . . . . All three major bipartisan tax reform plans—Bowles-Simpson,
Domenici-Rivlin and Wyden-Coats—include a corporate rate cut.”).
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Reducing the statutory CIT rate would make the United States a
more attractive business environment by lowering the tax cost of
doing business in the United States. At the margin, this would
help encourage more businesses to open and operate in the
United States.
The argument laid out above can be made for any country
that imposes a CIT. However, there is a sense among many that
the United States is in particular need of a CIT rate cut. The
basic argument is as follows: Over the last twenty-five years,
business has become increasingly mobile. This has fueled an
increase in tax competition among jurisdictions, which have cut
their statutory CIT rates to attract businesses.2 The United
States has not participated in this rate cutting and has kept its
statutory CIT rate relatively steady at a little below 40%.3 In
1990, a 40% CIT rate was slightly below the OECD average.4
However, by 2010, the average CIT rate of non-U.S. OECD
countries had fallen to approximately 25%.5 Thus, the United
States, by maintaining the same CIT rate, has found itself
changed from a low-CIT-rate country to the nation with the
highest statutory CIT rate in the OECD.6
Tax policy experts know that the story described above is
accurate, but incomplete.7 Focusing on the effective tax rates that
U.S. companies actually pay paints a more complicated picture.
U.S. CIT revenues, as a percentage of GDP, have been below the
OECD average almost every year since 1981.8 For example, in
2 See, e.g., Bert Brys, Stephen Matthews & Jeffrey Owens, Tax Reform Trends in
OECD Countries (OECD Ctr. for Tax Policy and Admin., Working Paper No. 1, 2011),
available at http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg3h0xxmz8t-en; Merrill, supra note 1, at
1009–10.
3 See Merrill, supra note 1, at 1010. This number includes both the federal
corporate tax rate and state- and local-level corporate income taxes. Id.
4 At that time, the average CIT rate of non-U.S. OECD countries was a little over
41%. See, e.g., OECD Corporate Income Tax Rates, 1981-2013, TAX FOUND. (Dec. 18,
2013),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/article/oecd-corporate-income-tax-rates-1981-2013
(reporting statistics corresponding to a 41.2% average CIT rate across non-U.S. OECD
member countries in 1990). The GDP-weighted average tax rate of non-U.S. OECD
member countries was even higher. Id.
5 See id. (reporting statistics corresponding to a 25.2% average CIT rate across
non-U.S. OECD member countries in 2010).
6 See, e.g., Kyle Pomerleau & Andrew Lundeen, The U.S. Has the Highest Corporate
Income Tax Rate in the OECD, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.tax
foundation.org/blog/us-has-highest-corporate-income-tax-rate-oecd (identifying the U.S.
CIT rate, including both federal and state-level CITs, as 39.1%, and the next-highest CIT
rate as Japan’s 37.0%).
7 See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 759 (2011)
(“[T]he gap between U.S. and world corporate [statutory] tax rate[s] . . . is sometimes
overstated.”).
8 Revenue Statistics - Comparative Tables, OECD STATEXTRACTS, http://stats.oe
cd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV (last visited July 11, 2014). In 1994 and 1995, the
U.S. percentage was 0.1% above the OECD average, and in 1996 the U.S. percentage and
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2009, U.S. CIT revenues constituted less than 2% of U.S. GDP,
one of the smallest proportions in the OECD.9 From this
perspective, the United States could be seen as a low-CIT nation.
Nonetheless, the general sense that the United States is a
high-tax environment for corporations seems to have set in, and
the impression seems to be a powerful one. This may be because
the statutory CIT rate is simply much more visible than most
other information about the corporate tax system. To the extent
that this perception drives investment behavior, this is a problem
for U.S. competitiveness. If so, this suggests that there may be
real benefits to reducing the corporate income tax rate—even if
doing so did not have a large impact on effective tax rates.
II. DOMESTIC TAX BENEFITS
In addition to increasing U.S. competitiveness, lowering the
statutory CIT rate would have a number of domestic benefits.
Our corporate tax laws affect all manner of business decisions,
including which legal entity to use, which types of business to
pursue, and how to fund the business. Many of these effects are
negative, and a lower CIT rate would help ameliorate them.
U.S. taxpayers can choose to operate their businesses
through a number of legal entities, including many pass-through
business entities that are not subject to entity-level tax. The
menu of pass-through options includes S corporations,
disregarded entities, and partnerships, as well as more
specialized structures such as regulated investment companies
(“RICs”) and real estate investment trusts (“REITs”).
The abundance of pass-through options is one of the reasons
why the United States has the highest statutory CIT rate in the
OECD, yet its CIT collects a smaller percentage of GDP than
other countries do. Consider a 2007 OECD study that looked at
the number of incorporated and unincorporated businesses with
varying characteristics in OECD member nations. It found that,
among U.S. businesses with annual income of $500,000 or more,
there were more than twice as many unincorporated businesses
as incorporated businesses.10 In every other country, this ratio
the OECD average were equal. On average, from 1982 through 2012 (the most recent year
for which data was available), the United States’ figure was 79% of the OECD average;
looking at medians gives a similar picture. Id.
9 See id. (indicating that, in 2009, U.S. taxes on corporate profits raised revenue
equal to 1.7% of U.S. GDP, tied with Austria for the third lowest among OECD countries;
the OECD average was 2.8%).
10 See ALFONS J. WEICHENRIEDER, OECD, SURVEY ON THE TAXATION OF SMALL AND
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES: DRAFT REPORT ON RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 7–8
tbl.1 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/39597756.pdf (reporting a
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was reversed—there were at least two incorporated businesses
for every unincorporated business at this income level.11
The U.S. pass-through sector has seen pronounced growth
since the 1980s. This growth seems tied to the tax reform bills of
the era, which reduced statutory tax rates for individuals12 and
raised the tax burden on corporate income, making it more tax
efficient to operate a business via a pass-through entity than
through the corporate form.13 The subsequent changes in
business entity choices, presumably due at least in part to these
changes in tax incentives, have been dramatic.
For example, in 1980, C corporations filed slightly more
federal tax returns than pass-through entities did, but the
figures were comparable.14 By 2008, pass-through entities filed
more than four times as many returns as C corporations did.15 In
1985, C corporations filed more than three times as many returns
as S corporations;16 by 2008, that ratio had almost reversed
itself.17 Looking at income earned, instead of at returns filed,
tells a similar story: in 1980, C corporations earned over four
times as much income as pass-through entities;18 by 2008,
pass-through entities earned significantly more income than C
corporations.19

total of 81,000 such unincorporated entities and 29,000 incorporated entities).
11 See id. The country with the next closest ratio is the United Kingdom, which had
2.1 incorporated businesses for every unincorporated business in this income range. Id.
12 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the marginal tax rate on the highest earners
from 50% to 28%. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 104(b)(8), 100 Stat.
2085, 2105.
13 In particular, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the General Utilities doctrine,
which enabled corporations to distribute appreciated property to shareholders without
triggering entity-level tax. This essentially enabled many corporations to avoid the
corporate income tax. When this doctrine was repealed, more corporate income was
subject to two levels of tax, once at the corporate level and once at the shareholder level,
significantly raising the effective tax rate on corporate income. Id.
14 That year, there were 2,163,458 C corporation returns filed, and a combined total
of 1,926,734 returns filed by S Corporations, RICs, REITs, and partnerships. These
figures do not include the 8,931,712 returns filed by non-farm sole proprietorships. See
SOI Tax Stats – Integrated Business Data, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. tbl.1, http://www.irs.
gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Integrated-Business-Data (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
15 Id. (reporting the filing of 1,782,478 returns by C corporations and a combined
total of 7,210,749 returns by S Corporations, RICs, REITs, and partnerships, not
including the 22,614,483 returns filed by non-farm sole proprietorships).
16 Id. (reporting that C corporations and S corporations filed 2,549,091 and 724,749
returns, respectively; a ratio of 3.52:1).
17 Id. (reporting that C corporations and S corporations filed 1,782,478 and 4,049,944
returns, respectively; a ratio of 1:2.27).
18 Id. (reporting C corporation net income of $288,701,762,000 and combined S
corporation, RIC, REIT, and partnership net income of $67,857,464,000; a ratio of 4.25:1).
19 Id. (reporting C corporation net income of $1,078,770,113,000 and combined S
corporation, RIC, REIT, and partnership net income of $1,728,971,856,000; a ratio of
1:1.603).
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If our tax laws are pushing U.S. businesses out of the
corporate form and into pass-through entities, that is not a good
thing. Essentially, this would mean that, when individuals are
choosing how to structure their businesses, tax law is putting a
thumb on the scale in favor of passthroughs and against C
corporations. That means that some businesses that would be
better managed as C corporations will not be conducted that way.
By pushing these businesses out of the CIT base, we both reduce
government revenue and reduce economic activity overall due to
the less efficient management structure.
Similarly, there are several other features of pass-through
entities that may also have negative economic impacts. For
example, S corporations have significant limits on their capital
structures, both in terms of the kinds of ownership interests that
they can issue20 and the shareholders that they are allowed to
have.21 Partnerships generally have more complicated returns
than corporations, increasing compliance costs. Incurring these
costs to reduce one’s tax bill may make perfect sense from an
individual businessperson’s perspective, but little sense from an
overall policy perspective. Lowering the corporate tax rate would
help to reduce the tax system’s influence on entity choice
decisions, reducing all of these costs.
In addition, U.S. tax laws provide many deductions and
credits that reduce the size of the CIT base.22 From a policy
perspective, this combination of a smaller base with a higher tax
rate leaves much to be desired. These deductions and credits also
tend to be fairly complicated, and are often industry-specific.23
This makes it more difficult to understand the tax system,
rendering the tax law more opaque. Such opacity makes it harder
for constituents to understand and evaluate what their
representatives have done, reducing political accountability and
the force of popular opinion on policymaking.
An increase in the use of business tax expenditures also
means that politically favored companies and industries are able
to get tax breaks that others are not.24 This disparate treatment

rate.

20
21
22

See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (2012).
See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A)–(C).
This is a second reason why U.S. CIT revenues are much lower than the statutory

23 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 179C (allowing the expensing of certain capital purchases for
refineries); I.R.C. § 179E (allowing the expensing of certain capital purchases for mine
safety equipment); I.R.C. § 181 (allowing the expensing of certain costs for qualified film
and television productions).
24 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010)
(discussing same); see also Jordan Barry, Response, On Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L.
REV. SEE ALSO 69 (2011).

Do Not Delete

24

9/27/2014 9:56 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:1

is unfair, as it treats similarly situated taxpayers differently.25
Moreover, the tax system is once again putting its thumb on the
scale in favor of certain businesses relative to others, producing a
different outcome than market competition would otherwise
produce. More colloquially, the tax system is picking winners and
losers. This is likely to produce inefficient outcomes.
The combined effects of these deductions and credits have
been quite significant. For example, in 2009, publicly traded
biotechnology firms had an average effective CIT rate of 4.5%. 26
In contrast, publicly traded trucking firms had an average
effective CIT rate of 30.9%.27
Reducing the statutory CIT rate reduces the value of tax
breaks. This both decreases the unfairness in treatment between
favored and disfavored industries and the extent to which the tax
system encourages certain types of economic activity over others.
Higher CIT rates also encourage capital structures with a
higher percentage of debt relative to equity.28 Because interest
payments are deductible, money paid out to creditors is only
subject to tax once, at the creditor level. In contrast, dividends
paid to stockholders are subject to tax twice: First, the
corporation pays tax when it earns the income. Second, the
shareholder pays tax when she receives the dividend. The
increased use of debt financing makes companies more brittle; in
a downturn, a company funded with equity can reduce its
dividend or suspend paying a dividend altogether. On the other
hand, a company that cannot make interest payments on its debt
faces the prospect of bankruptcy. This can potentially exacerbate
business cycles, making recessions and depressions more severe
and longer lasting.29
25 Another way to describe this phenomenon is that it constitutes a violation of the
principle of horizontal equity.
26 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Corporate Tax Code Proves Hard to Change, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/us/politics/28tax.html; see also
Mike Bostock et al., Across U.S. Companies, Tax Rates Vary Greatly, N.Y. TIMES (May
25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/25/sunday-review/corporate-taxes.
html (reporting effective CIT rates among S&P 500 companies by sector; the range was
significant; utilities paid an average effective CIT rate of 12%, while retailers paid 34%).
27 Bostock et al., supra note 26.
28 See, e.g., Ruud A. de Mooij, The Tax Elasticity of Corporate Debt: A Synthesis of
Size and Variations (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/95, 2011), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1195.pdf (collecting and reviewing
studies of the effect of the CIT on the use of debt financing). Tax rates can also affect
corporate capital structures in more subtle ways. See, e.g., Jordan M. Barry & John
William Hatfield, Pills and Partisans: Understanding Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 633, 658–59 (2012) (discussing how tax considerations can influence the structure of
corporate mergers and acquisitions).
29 See, e.g., Hilary J. Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage
Stability, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 821, 839–44 (2013) (discussing the effect of the
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III. POLITICAL AGREEMENT
The consensus for cutting the CIT rate also extends to the
political arena. For example, during the 2012 presidential
election, both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney advocated for a
CIT rate cut.30 More surprisingly, both advocated for nearly the
same cut: Mitt Romney proposed a 25% federal CIT rate.31
Barack Obama proposed a 28% federal CIT rate, along with a
deduction for manufacturers that would ultimately give them a
25% federal CIT rate.32 Considering the degree of polarization in
contemporary politics and the 35% federal CIT rate currently in
effect,33 the size of the gap between these two policy positions
seems quite small.
In addition, cutting the CIT rate could help reduce
disagreement surrounding one of the tax policy questions on
which Democrats and Republicans are most strongly
divided: How should the United States tax income earned by U.S.
corporations and their subsidiaries in non-U.S. jurisdictions?
Currently, U.S. corporations with foreign subsidiaries
generally do not owe U.S. tax on income that those subsidiaries
earn overseas until they repatriate those earnings.34 This system
has several negative effects: Most other companies’ corporations
are not subject to domestic tax on income that they earn in other
countries. Because U.S. corporations investing abroad can face
an additional level of tax, this can place them at a competitive
disadvantage. Further, because income earned in foreign
jurisdictions is not subject to U.S. tax until repatriated, it
encourages U.S. businesses to move profits to lower-tax
countries. Finally, because profits earned abroad are not subject
CIT deduction for debt on banks, and suggesting that the effect is much larger than the
“too big to fail” subsidy enjoyed by the largest institutions).
30 See THE WHITE HOUSE & THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S
FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM 1 (2012) [hereinafter OBAMA PLAN], available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framewor
k-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf; BELIEVE IN AMERICA: MITT ROMNEY’S PLAN
FOR JOBS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 6 (2011) [hereinafter ROMNEY PLAN], available at
http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Items/MittRomney/BelieveInAmerica-PlanForJobsAndE
conomicGrowth-Full.pdf.
31 See ROMNEY PLAN, supra note 30, at 6, 43–45. This proposal did not end with the
Romney campaign, and remains favored in Republican circles. In February 2014, House
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp put forward a tax reform proposal
that also includes a 25% CIT rate. See HOUSE C OMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH C ONG.,
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014: FIXING OUR BROKEN TAX CODE SO THAT IT WORKS FOR
AMERICAN FAMILIES AND J OB CREATORS 19 (2014), available at http://www.waysand
means.house.gov/uploadedfiles/tax_reform_executive_summary.pdf.
32 See OBAMA PLAN, supra note 30, at 1, 9, 12.
33 This is a slight oversimplification. See I.R.C. § 11(b) (2012).
34 This is an oversimplification. Special rules apply to certain types of income,
sometimes referred to as Subpart F income. See I.R.C. §§ 951–965.
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to U.S. tax until they are returned to the United States,
companies have an incentive to keep those profits overseas
instead of bringing them back to the United States.
Democrats and Republicans have weighed these varying
concerns differently. Democrats have tended to focus on reducing
the incentive for U.S. businesses to move profits overseas. For
example, President Barack Obama has proposed a minimum tax
on foreign income at the time it is earned.35 This would help
reduce the relative benefits of earning income offshore instead of
in the United States, but would make U.S. businesses competing
abroad less competitive.36 Republicans, in contrast, have focused
more on the issue of U.S. competitiveness. Mitt Romney
advocated switching to a territorial tax system, which would
mean no U.S. tax on income earned abroad.37 This would improve
the competitive position of U.S. businesses operating abroad;
however, it would also increase U.S. businesses’ incentives to
move profits overseas.38
Regardless, cutting the CIT rate helps with all three of these
concerns: It reduces the competitive disadvantage to U.S.
corporations from being subject to the U.S. CIT. It narrows the
tax differential between earning profits in the United States and
earning them in low-tax jurisdictions, reducing the incentive to
shift profits out of the country. It reduces the tax cost of
repatriating foreign earnings, which will encourage more
repatriation at the margin. Thus, cutting the U.S. CIT rate is
both a point of agreement across both parties, as well as a policy
measure that will help reduce the magnitude of existing political
disagreements.
CONCLUSION
This Article recaps some of the chief factors that have fueled
the emerging consensus in favor of a cut in the statutory CIT
rate. That said, it bears emphasis that tax policy experts
generally envision such a cut as part of a larger tax reform
package—and there is considerable disagreement on what the
rest of that package should look like.
See OBAMA PLAN, supra note 30, at 14.
Currently, the advantage of foreign profits is that U.S. tax on such profits is
deferred until they are repatriated. See id. at 13. Under such a change, more tax would be
due at the time the income is earned, reducing the amount of tax deferred. Id. at 14. Such
a change would also help reduce taxpayers’ incentives to leave foreign profits in foreign
subsidiaries. Id.
37 See ROMNEY PLAN, supra note 30, at 45–46.
38 Currently, the advantage of foreign profits is that U.S. tax on such profits is
deferred until they are repatriated. See id. at 46. Under this change, such profits would be
exempt from U.S. taxation—a significantly larger advantage.
35
36
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Many call for a CIT rate cut to be paired with
base-broadening provisions that eliminate or pare down existing
deductions and credits.39 Commentators disagree on which
deductions and credits to target, and to what extent. Some,
concerned about budget deficits, believe that a CIT rate cut can
only be enacted if accompanied by spending cuts, new revenue
raised from individuals, or a combination of both. Other
commentators worry that a CIT rate cut could reduce the
progressivity of our tax system, exacerbating economic
inequality,40 and must be enacted along with other tax provisions
designed to counteract this effect. On a more nuts-and-bolts level,
a reduced corporate tax rate, coupled with capital gains
treatment for dividends, could render income earned through the
corporate form subject to less tax than income earned by
individuals.41 This could open up an opportunity for tax
avoidance and reduce the effectiveness of the individual income
tax.
All of these are significant concerns for policymakers, and
assembling a package that addresses them all will not be easy.
Nor does it seem probable that such a package will emerge in the
near future. But, given the broad support among commentators
and policymakers for cutting the statutory CIT rate, such a cut
does seem very likely to happen—eventually.

See, e.g., OBAMA PLAN, supra note 30, at 9–10.
The short version of this argument is as follows: The burden of the CIT is
primarily borne by a combination of shareholders and executives. Both tend to be
wealthier than the average American. Accordingly, reducing the corporate tax will reduce
the tax burden on those with more income, rendering the tax system less progressive.
41 For example, a 20% CIT rate, coupled with a 20% capital gains rate on dividends
would mean that shareholders keep 80% of 80% (=64%) of distributed corporate profits—
in other words, the net tax rate on such income is 36%. This is less than the current top
individual rate. Moreover, if profits grow as money is reinvested, deferring the payment of
dividends and reinvesting at the corporate level subject to a lower tax rate can
significantly magnify this advantage.
39
40
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